Development General Dynamics F-111C

1 development

1.1 background
1.2 replacing canberra
1.3 hancock study
1.4 decision
1.5 procurement, delays, , renaming
1.6 delivery

development
background


two raaf f-111 aircraft during exercise kangaroo 81

in june 1960, united states air force issued requirement f-105 thunderchief replacement. u.s. navy began program develop new air defence fighter use on large aircraft carriers. on 14 february 1961, newly appointed united states secretary of defense robert mcnamara formally directed services study development of single aircraft satisfy both requirements. tactical fighter experimental (tfx) requirements based largely on air force s needs. request proposals (rfp) tfx provided industry in october 1961. after 4 rounds of proposals, general dynamics (gd) selected on boeing; gd signed tfx contract in december 1962.

the usaf f-111a , navy f-111b variants used same airframe structural components , tf30-p-1 turbofan engines. featured side-by-side crew seating in escape capsule, required navy. because of conflict between air force , navy on requirements had precedence, mcnamara intervened in 1961, declaring air force desires override suggestions navy. f-111a variant first flew on 21 december 1964 carswell afb, texas. followed f-111b, first flew on 18 may 1965.

as f-111 development continued, stall issues arose in parts of flight regime; these addressed modifying engine inlet in 1965–66, ending triple plow , triple plow ii designs. f-111b cancelled navy in 1968 due weight , performance deficiencies. improved f-111e, f-111d, f-111f models subsequently developed usaf. fb-111a strategic bomber , ef-111 electronic warfare versions later developed usaf. production ended in 1976, total of 563 f-111s of variants built, below prediction of 1,500.

replacing canberra

raaf canberra mk.20 of no. 2 squadron during strike out of phan rang air base, vietnam, march 1970

the menzies government first publicly discussed need replacing english electric canberra in 1954, year after raaf began receiving bomber. non-supersonic canberra lacked radar , electronic countermeasures, disadvantages based on korean war experience. raaf believed needed new strategic bomber fulfill nation s obligations commonwealth strategic reserve in malaysia, anzus, , seato. air staff requirement 36 year mandated all-weather attack aircraft 1959 capable of delivering variety of bombs , missiles. study recommended 1 of british v bombers, prime minister robert menzies minister of defence frederick shedden decided in 1956 @ £1 million each expensive.

air marshal valston hancock, chief of air staff, stated in april 1960 australia needed replacement canberra. although in mid-1962 menzies government again decided not replace canberra, indonesia s increasingly aggressive statements regarding malaysia caused australia reevaluate decision. sydney morning herald reported in october 1962 indonesian air force s soviet tupolev tu-16 bombers reach sydney or other australian city light bomb load, while canberras not fly in weather , had range of 900 miles (1,400 km), insufficient reach jakarta. opposition labor party, led arthur calwell, used report criticize menzies. government denied tu-16 reach sydney, minister air frederick osborne acknowledged canberras weakest link in our armoury @ present moment . stated, however, available foreign bombers unsuitable raaf. american boeing b-52 stratofortress , convair b-58 hustler, example, large existing australian runways. more suitable aircraft such british bac tsr-2 , american tfx (later f-111) available, osborne said.

hancock study

in may 1963 menzies announced a£200 million increase in defence spending on next 5 years, , proposed send team led hancock overseas evaluate canberra replacements. candidates french dassault mirage iv, tsr-2, , u.s. north american a-5 vigilante, mcdonnell douglas f-4 phantom ii , tfx. june august, hancock s team visited france, britain , united states evaluate competitors, , determined tfx aircraft best suited role. mirage iv had insufficient range , a£108 million price expensive. f-4 , a-5 available, less expensive f-4 need air-to-air refueling reach indonesia australia. tsr-2 behind schedule , on budget, expensive @ a£122 million 24 aircraft, , british government support program uncertain. while tfx controversial in united states, promised performance specifications , per-aircraft cost superior of tsr-2. did not expect tfx available before 1970, however, hancock recommended buying 36 a-5 aircraft a£88 million counteract perceived imminent threat indonesia.

the menzies government reluctant choose interim replacement a-5 or f-4, not deployed until 1966 , cost a$120–180 million. waiting tsr-2 or tfx in 1969 or 1970 seemed pose great risk, when considering hancock s findings in september 1963 wanted able offer substantial response labor party s criticism of defence strategy. british , american governments competed on behalf of nations unbuilt bombers, both believed export sales increase domestic support aircraft. menzies government viewed british promise deploy squadron of v bombers in australia interim defense until tsr-2 ready unacceptable both technical , political reasons. beyond cost, royal air force had not ordered tsr-2; chief of defence staff lord louis mountbatten, opposed it, advised australians against buying aircraft , raaf feared being customer.

decision

the government determined did not need go ahead immediate replacement canberra , preferred hancock s original choice of tfx long-term solution, leading menzies government s announcement on 24 october ordering 24 f-111s us$125 million, enough 2 squadrons. announcement came during campaigning 1963 general election. calwell s labor party had on 22 october reiterated pre-campaign promise replace canberras formed government. government s announcement, , consequent improvement of chances against labor, benefited united states; purchase helped rebut american critics of tfx, , kennedy administration preferred menzies defence policies opposition s. contract signed following year through u.s. department of defense. british government s cancellation of tsr-2 in april 1965 showed australia s decision not order correct.

procurement, delays, , renaming

the u.s. offered 2 squadrons of boeing b-47 stratojets free lease pending delivery of f-111; australia declined offer in june 1964—despite aircraft having been demonstrated around country before 1963 election interim canberra replacement, sign of american preference menzies— because b-47 did not offer significant improvements on canberra and, v bombers, require longer runways.

the immensely complex , ambitious f-111 design , construction process forced australian government adopt sophisticated american procurement , project management methods. although australia planned buy american f-111a design, raaf liaison officers requested country-specific changes such long-distance radio, aeronautical research laboratories in melbourne participated in intake redesign , provided metal fatigue expertise, , australian test pilot evaluated australian version s longer wings , performance in tropical conditions. differences f-111a caused designated f-111c in 1966.

delivery

the first f-111c officially delivered in 1968, giving australia aircraft fly jakarta, drop bombs, , return without refueling. (the raaf acquired air-to-air refueling f/a-18, possibly avoid causing difficulties other asian countries increasing f-111c s great range.) training began in 1967, raaf personnel seeing terrain-following radar , other sophisticated equipment first time. however, development delays , structural problems delayed acceptance of aircraft raaf until 1973. these issues wing attach points, , redesign of f-111 engine intakes. completion of contractual requirements satisfaction of australia took time, damaging morale of hundreds of trained raaf personnel had little do. program costs, during 1963–1967, grew @ alarming rate; estimates usaf @ start of program placed @ us$124.5 million, april 1967 had risen $237.75 million. while initial price of us$5.21 million per aircraft capped @ us$5.95 million, r&d, labor, , other costs not. rising price, 3 unexplained losses of usaf f-111as in vietnam during first month of deployment, , british , u.s. navy s orders cancellations caused further controversy in australia during 1968. 1973, however, when f-111a had accumulated 250,000 flight hours, had best safety record among contemporary aircraft, presaged f-111c s own excellent record.

four aircraft modified rf-111c reconnaissance configuration during 1979–80, retaining strike capability. rf-111c carried reconnaissance pack 4 cameras , infrared linescanner unit. 4 ex-usaf f-111as refitted f-111c standard , delivered australia attrition replacements in 1982. there f-111cs equipped carry pave tack flir/laser pods in mid-1980s. underwent extensive avionics upgrade program through 1998. under program, f-111c upgraded digital avionics. included twin mission computers, modern digital databus, digital weapon management system, new an/apq-171 terrain-following radar, new an/apq-169 attack radar, , twin ring-laser gyro ins.

in late 2001, wing fatigue problems discovered in 1 of f-111c fleet. result, decision made in may 2002 replace wings spares taken ex-usaf f-111fs stored @ aerospace maintenance , regeneration center (amarc). short span wings underwent refurbishment in australia, included extending span, in effect making wings same f-111c , f-111g models. following avionics upgrade program, australian f-111s received weapons system , various other upgrades.